82FVBENP Plea (In open court) (Case called) THE DEPUTY CLERK: The case is United States against Phillip Bennett; docket number 05 CR 1192. Is the government ready to proceed? MR. BAROFSKY: Yes. Neil Barofsky for the government.

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With me at counsel table, with your Honor's permission, is Christopher Garcia of our office, our postal inspectors on the case, William Johnson and Kris Moon, as well as our legal intern, Annie Railton, who's been assisting the trial of this matter. Good evening, your Honor.

MR. GARCIA: Good evening, your Honor.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Is the defense ready to proceed?

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, we are. Gary Naftalis for Mr. Bennett, along with David Frankel.

THE COURT: Mr. Naftalis?

MR. NAFTALIS: Your Honor, we have an application on behalf of Mr. Bennett to withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charges in the indictment and to offer to plead quilty to the charges in the indictment.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bennett, would you stand Would you raise your right hand. please.

(Defendant sworn)

THE COURT: And would you state your full name for me please.

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1	THE DEFENDANT: Phillip Roger Bennett.
2	THE COURT: And Mr. Bennett, how old are you?
3	THE DEFENDANT: 59, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Why don't you sit down. Mr. Bennett, what
5	was the highest grade in school that you completed?
6	THE DEFENDANT: University. Grade, twelfth grade, I
7	think it is, your Honor.
8	THE COURT: You have the equivalent of a college
9	degree.
10	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, master of arts.
11	THE COURT: And are you now or have you currently been
12	under the care of a doctor or psychiatrist?
13	THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: And have you ever been hospitalized or
15	treated for alcoholism or narcotics addiction?
16	THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drug or
18	alcohol today?
19	THE DEFENDANT: I'm not, no, your Honor.
20	THE COURT: And how are you feeling physically today?
21	THE DEFENDANT: Fine, your Honor. Thank you.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, have you had the opportunity
23	to review the charges against you and your plea with
24	Mr. Naftalis and Mr. Frankel and perhaps some other lawyers, as
25	well?
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THE DEFENDANT: I have, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: And have you been satisfied with the advice and counsel that Messrs. Naftalis and Frankel have given to you?

THE DEFENDANT: I have, yes.

THE COURT: Are you ready to change your plea at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: I am, your Honor.

THE COURT: And what is your plea at this time, guilty or not guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: It's guilty, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, in order to determine whether your plea is voluntary and made with a full understanding of the charges against you and the consequences of your plea, I will make certain statements to you and I will ask you certain questions. I want you to understand that I need not accept your plea unless I am satisfied that you are, in fact, guilty, and that you fully understand your rights. I'm tempted to ask the government to pick a few favorite charges instead of all of these, but, okay.

Mr. Bennett, you've been charged in the 20-count indictment.

The first count charges you with a conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering, and to make false filings to the SEC. This crime

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carries a maximum sentence under the law of five years imprisonment, a maximum fine of the greatest of \$250,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to persons other than yourself as a result of the offense, and a \$100 special assessment, and a maximum term of supervised release of three years.

Do you understand that those are the charges in Count
One of the indictment and the maximum statutory penalties
applicable to those charges?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Counts Two and Three of the indictment charge you with securities fraud. Each of these counts carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, a maximum fine of \$5,000,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other than yourself as a result of the offense, a \$100 special assessment, and a maximum term of supervised release of three years.

Do you understand that those are the charges in Counts
Two and Three and the maximum penalties under law for those
charges of securities fraud?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Count Four charges you with making a false filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. And this crime carries a maximum statutory penalty of 20 years in

prison, a maximum fine of the greatest of \$5,000,000 or twice the gross monetary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross monetary loss to a person other than yourself as a result of the offense, a \$100 special assessment, and a maximum term of supervised release of three years.

Do you understand that those are the charges in Count Four and the maximum penalties applicable to those charges?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Counts Five and Six of the indictment charge you with making a false filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission -- excuse me, with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Each of these counts carries a maximum sentence under the law of five years imprisonment, a maximum fine of the greatest of \$250,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other than yourself as a result of the offense, and a \$100 special assessment, and a maximum supervised release term of three years. Do you understand that those are the charges in Counts Five and Six of the indictment and the maximum penalties provided for by law for those crimes?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Counts Seven through Thirteen of the indictment charge you with wire fraud. Each of these counts carries a maximum possible sentence of 20 years in prison, a maximum fine of the greatest of \$250,000 or twice the gross

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pecuniary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other than yourself as a result of the offense, a \$100 special assessment, and a maximum term of supervised release of three years.

Do you understand that those are the charges in Counts Seven through Thirteen, and the maximum penalties under the statute for those charges?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Count Fourteen charges you with making material misstatements to auditors. And this crime carries a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment, a maximum fine of \$5,000,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other than yourself as a result of the offense, a \$100 special assessment, and a maximum term of supervised release of three years.

Do you understand that that is the crime charged in Count Fourteen of the indictment, and the maximum penalty provided for by statute for Count Fourteen?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Count Fifteen of the indictment charges you with bank fraud. And this crime carries a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison, a maximum fine of the greatest of \$1,000,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other

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than yourself as a result of the offense, a \$100 special assessment, and a maximum term of supervised release of five years.

Do you understand that that is the charge in Count Fifteen, and that those are the maximum penalties provided for by law?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. Forgive me, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Counts Sixteen through Twenty charge you with money laundering. Each of these counts carries a maximum possible sentence of ten years imprisonment, a maximum fine of the greatest of \$250,000, twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other than yourself as a result of the offense, and a \$100 mandatory special assessment, and a maximum supervised release term of five years.

Do you understand that those are the crimes charged in Counts Sixteen through Twenty, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you also understand that the Court must impose an order of restitution by law?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you understand that you are also subject to mandatory asset forfeiture?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you understand that you have the right to plead not guilty and the right to a trial on the charges against you and, in fact, the right to a jury trial?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: At this time, I'd ask the government to recite the elements of the crimes charged.

MR. BAROFSKY: Yes, your Honor. For Count One, conspiracy, the government would have to prove the following elements:

First, that an agreement or understanding existed to commit the objects charged in the indictment. Second, the defendant knowingly became a member of that agreement or understanding. And third, that one of the conspirators knowingly committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy during the life of the conspiracy.

With respect to Counts Two and Three, securities fraud, the government would have to prove, first, that Bennett, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and for Count Two, that would be the notes described in the indictment, and in Count Three, the common stock of Refco described in the indictment, he did one or more of the following: He either employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact which made what was said under the circumstances

misleading or engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit on a purchaser or seller. Second, that Bennett acted knowingly, willfully, and with intent to defraud. And, third, that he used or caused to be used any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, but he used the mails in furtherance of the fraudulent conduct.

With respect to Count Four, which charges false filing under the Exchange Act, the first element the government would have to prove is that Refco was required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to file the 10-K that's described in Count Four. And, second, the defendant knowingly and willfully made or caused to be made a materially false or misleading statement in that document or omitted to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.

With respect to Counts Five and Six, false filings under the Securities Act, the government would have to prove, again, first, that Refco was required under the Securities Act of 1933 to file the S4, which is described in Count Five, and the S1 registration statement described in Count Six. And, second, that Bennett knowingly and willfully made or caused to be made a materially false or misleading statement in those documents or omitted to state any material fact required to be state therein or necessary to make the statements therein not

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With respect to Counts Seven through Thirteen of wire fraud, the government would have to prove, first, that a scheme to defraud must have existed; that Bennett must have participated in the scheme with intent to defraud; that misrepresentations or omissions must have related to material facts were made in furtherance of the fraud; that the scheme was executed to obtain money or property; and that in the execution of the scheme, Bennett used or caused to be used the interstate wires listed in the indictment. And here for Count Seven is the June 22nd of 2004 email from Robert Trosten; in Count Eight, the August 3, '04 email from Robert Trosten; in Count Nine, the April 6, '05 transmission of the S4 from New York to Virginia; in Count Ten, the July 19th, 2005 transmission of 10-K from New York to Virginia; in Count Eleven, the August 5th, 2004 transmission of \$4,000,000 from New York to Illinois; in Count Twelve, the August 5th, 2004 transmission of \$40,000,000 from New York to Illinois: and in Count Thirteen, the August 8th, 2005 transmission of the S1 registration statement from New York to Virginia.

For Count Fourteen, material misstatements to auditors, the government would have to prove, first, that Refco was a public company that was required to submit financial statements to the SEC; second, that Bennett was a director/officer of Refco; third, Bennett knowingly and

willfully made, caused to be made, a materially false or misleading statement or omitted to state a material fact necessary order to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made not misleading to an accountant, and that the statement was made in connection with the audit or examination of the financial statements of Refco required to be made pursuant to the Act.

Count Fifteen charges the defendant with bank fraud. And specifically, that on August 5th, 2004, defrauded HSBC. And the government would have to prove, first, there was a scheme to defraud a bank by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; second, that Bennett executed or attempted to execute the scheme with intent to defraud the bank, here, again, HSBC; and third, at the time of the execution of the scheme, HSBC had its deposits insured by the FDIC. And I'll represent to the Court that at the relevant time periods, HSBC's deposits were insured by the FDIC.

And finally, Counts Sixteen through Twenty charge the defendant with money laundering. And the government would have to prove, first, that Bennett engaged or attempted to engage in monetary transactions involving criminally derived property of a value greater than \$10,000; second, that the property involved in the monetary transaction was, in fact, derived and specified unlawful activity; third, that Bennett acted

knowingly. And for these purposes, wire fraud, bank fraud, and securities fraud are all specified unlawful activities and would have to prove each of the transactions listed in the indictment in Counts Sixteen through Twenty, basically the wire transactions which are described therein.

THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, do you understand that if you pled not guilty and went to trial, that the burden would be on the government to prove each and every element of every crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict you of that crime?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that at a trial you would have the right to be represented by an attorney at all stages of the proceeding and, if necessary, an attorney would be appointed for you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that at a trial you would have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right not to be compelled to incriminate yourself?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you understand that at a trial you would be presumed innocent until such time, if ever, the government established your guilt by competent evidence to the satisfaction of the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: And do you understand that at a trial you would have the right to testify and would also be entitled to compulsory process; in other words, the right to call other witnesses on your behalf? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: And do you understand that if your plea is accepted, that there will be no further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty, you are waiving your right to a trial? THE DEFENDANT: I do understand that, your Honor, yes. THE COURT: And do you understand that if you are sentenced to a period of supervised release, and if you violate the terms of your supervised release, that an additional period of jail time may be imposed without credit for the time that you've previously spent on supervised release? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Do you understand that in connection with your plea of guilty, that the Court may ask you certain questions about the offense to which you have pled; and if you answer those questions under oath and on the record and in the presence of your counsel, that your answers are false may later be used against you in a prosecution against you for perjury or false statement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I recall, Mr. Bennett, you're a citizen of Great Britain.

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THE DEFENDANT: I am, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that following any sentence that you receive, that you will likely be deported?

THE DEFENDANT: That is my understanding, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that in determining your sentence, that the Court is obligated to calculate the applicable sentencing guidelines range, and to consider that range and any possible departures under the guidelines and other sentencing factors under the statute which entitles the Court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And have you reviewed with your counsel the government's letter to them of yesterday which explains the government's position as to the sentence that you face if the sentencing guidelines are applied to your case?

THE DEFENDANT: I have reviewed it, your Honor, correct.

THE COURT: Actually, that was said very badly. Let me just try it again so that there's no confusion.

Have you reviewed that letter with your lawyers which sets forth the government's calculation of the sentence that you face under the sentencing guidelines?

THE DEFENDANT: I have reviewed it.

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THE COURT: And do you understand that the government calculates that under the guidelines, that you face a sentence of life imprisonment; and that it has calculated that the maximum possible statutory sentence is 315 years; and that the fine range is from 25,000 to \$5,000,000? THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, your Honor, correct. THE COURT: And do you understand that that calculation by the guidelines -- that by the government is just based on the information they currently have? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: And do you further understand that the government's letter doesn't bind either the Court or the probation department, and that ultimately the sentence that you receive will be determined by the Court? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, have any threats or promises been made to you to make you plead guilty? THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Have any understandings or promises been made to you concerning the sentence that you will receive? THE DEFENDANT: None. THE COURT: Is your plea voluntary? THE DEFENDANT: It is, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, did you commit the crimes

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that you've been charged with in the indictment?

THE DEFENDANT: I did, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you tell me in your own words what you did?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, during the period that I served as CEO of Refco, I agreed with other Refco executives to enter into a series of transactions at the end of Refco's financial reporting periods to make it appear as if a receivable due to Refco from Refco Upholdings, Inc., a related party, was instead due from an independent third-party customer.

The IGHI receivable was composed of, amongst other things, historical customer losses, bad debts, and expenses that IGHI had incurred on behalf of Refco.

I, along with other Refco executives, have caused Refco to enter into these transactions in order to conceal the size and nature of the IGHI receivable. We concealed the receivable from, amongst others, Refco's auditors, Thomas H. Lee Partners, various lenders who, in 2004, participated in Refco's senior secured credit facility, and the issuance of 9 percent senior subordinated notes, and also investors in Refco's common stock.

Among the lenders to whom I knowingly caused the IGHI receivable to be misrepresented was HSBC Bank, referenced in Count Fifteen of the indictment. I and other Refco executives

also used the interstate wires to accomplish these acts within this district, as referenced in Counts Seven through Thirteen. Furthermore, I caused funds obtained from the transaction with Thomas H. Lee Partners, referenced in paragraph 34 of the indictment, to be wired to various parties receiving proceeds from the transaction, as referenced in Counts Sixteen through Twenty, knowing that this money had been unlawfully obtained.

The IGHI receivable and related party transaction used to conceal it were material information that Refco investors and lenders would have wanted to have known prior to investing in or lending money to Refco. While I believed that I would be able to pay the IGHI receivable down over time, and did, in fact, ultimately pay off the receivable balance in its entirety, I knew that failing to disclose the receivable was wrong; I knew that obtaining funds from Refco's investors and lenders based on misleading financial statements was also wrong.

I also caused Refco to file documents with the SEC, namely S1, S4, and 10-K that did not disclose the full extent of the IGHI receivable or the transactions used to conceal it; and, thus, were false and misleading with respect to material facts. I knew that failing to disclose these facts in public filings and in connection with Refco's sale and registration of Refco's notes and common stock was wrong, and I deeply regret having done so.

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1 Your Honor, I take full responsibility for my actions. 2 I wish to publicly apologize to my family and to all of those 3 who have been harmed by my conduct. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Barofsky, is there anything else you 4 5 would want me to ask the defendant? 6 MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, can we just have a moment 7 to review? There's a lot of elements. Thank you, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Certainly. 9 (Pause) 10 MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, just a couple of areas for 11 clarification. First, if you can please ask the defendant to confirm that he was a director or officer of Refco during this 12 13 relevant time period. Should I go one-by-one? 14 THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, can you confirm that? 15 THE DEFENDANT: I was, your Honor. 16 MR. BAROFSKY: Second, your Honor, that the 17 misstatements made about Refco's auditor was in connection with 18 the auditor's preparation of a financial statement, and that 19 occurred after April of 2005. 20 THE COURT: Can you confirm that? 21 THE DEFENDANT: That's correct, your Honor. 22 MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, and if you can ask the defendant to confirm he made reference to various wire 23 24 transfers and wire communications, as well as certain filings 25 in the indictment, if you could please confirm with the

defendant that those acts occurred on or about the dates set forth in the indictment.

THE DEFENDANT: They did, your Honor.

MR. BAROFSKY: And finally, your Honor, as I noted earlier, I will represent to the Court that HSBC was -- deposits were insured by the FDIC during the relevant time period; and also that Refco was an entity that was required to file the various reports and documents and registration statements under the Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, as well as to file financial statements with respect to the 10-K and the misstatement to auditors account. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, do you still wish to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Naftalis, do you know of any reason that Mr. Bennett ought not plead guilty?

MR. NAFTALIS: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, I'm satisfied that you understand the nature of the charge against you and the consequences of your plea; and that your plea is made voluntarily and knowingly; and that there is a factual basis for it. Accordingly, I will accept your plea of guilty and direct that a presentence report be prepared.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: As for a sentencing date, can I just

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basically count out the requisite number of days or does the 1 2 government have a view that it should be maybe a little bit 3 more off into the future in light of the trial that's still 4 upcoming? 5 MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, we think we can be prepared 6 in three months. 7 THE COURT: All right. Why don't we set sentencing for May 20th at 4 o'clock. And since I would anticipate some 8 9 significant presentence submissions, I think we should set a 10 schedule for that. Why don't we say that the government's submission is due -- the defense submission is due on May 6th, 11 12 and the government's on May 13th. 13 MR. BAROFSKY: That's fine, your Honor. 14 MR. NAFTALIS: Your Honor, if there are things in the 15 government submission that we want to respond to, that's sort 16 of --17 THE COURT: Doesn't give you quite enough time. 18 MR. NAFTALIS: We don't have -- you're having us 19 first, so we don't really sort of provide -- they could go 20 first, we could go second; we wouldn't object to that. 21 MR. BAROFSKY: We could do simultaneous submissions, as well, your Honor, on the 6th and then we could each respond. THE COURT: Sounds like fun. MR. BAROFSKY: Okay.

It's a living.

MR. NAFTALIS:

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THE COURT: Let's not go there. Okay? Are we done?

MR. BAROFSKY: No, your Honor. There is the issue of bail. And at this time, your Honor, the government does request that defendant be remanded. And if your Honor will let me, I would like to speak briefly on the topic.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BAROFSKY: Obviously the standard has changed

MR. BAROFSKY: Obviously the standard has changed under the Bail Act under 3143. Before when we appeared before your Honor several years ago, the burden was ours to prove the defendant was a risk of flight. Now, of course, it is the defendant's burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee. And respectfully, we submit that there have been some extremely significant changed circumstances, that we respectfully submit the defendant cannot meet the burden in this case.

First of all, under the current bond, which, as your Honor may recall, is a \$50,000,000 bond, secured by \$5,000,000 in cash and two properties, that security is now essentially worthless; it's essentially an unsecured bond, because all of those properties and that money are subject to asset forfeiture. The \$5,000,000 we have traced as direct proceeds from the IPO, which the defendant has just admitted was money that was fraudulently obtained, and we already have lis pendens on both of the properties, because basically under substitute assets, we'd be able to take those, as well. Those are all

subject to asset forfeiture and, therefore, don't provide any security for the existing bond.

Secondly, the defendant is facing a \$2.4 billion asset forfeiture. We don't think he has \$2.4 billion, but we do believe that will essentially -- through proceeds and substitute assets, once this conviction is final -- will basically deprive the defendant of all of his assets. We have restrained a number of his assets pretrial, but we have not been able to restrain assets that we haven't been able to prove are directly traceable. And we don't know the exact amount of those items, but we believe that they are in the \$20,000,000 range, which would certainly facilitate the ability of the defendant to flee.

Third, and I guess the most obvious point, is the defendant now faces an advisory guideline range of 315 years of imprisonment. And that obviously changes the calculus a lot from when we last appeared before your Honor. We're not suggesting that your Honor is going to --

THE COURT: He always faced that, right?

MR. BAROFSKY: Yes, your Honor; but before, pretrial -- I'm sorry, pre-guilty plea, there was no certainty that he was necessarily going to be convicted in this case.

Now, jail is an inevitability. And I don't mean to presume what the ultimate sentence will be in this case, because there's obviously no way to predict what the precise sentence

will be, but the best guess, I think, from anyone's perspective, is that it will be a substantial prison sentence. And for this defendant -- he is now with certainty facing such a sentence that has -- under the guidelines is the equivalent of a life sentence.

Defendant is 59 years old. A sentence of -- a significant sentence in this case may very well prove to be the equivalent of a life sentence. The defendant is facing certain deportation after he serves that sentence.

THE COURT: Not to a bad place though.

MR. BAROFSKY: Not to a bad place, your Honor. But it does give the defendant a tremendous incentive to self-deport. In other words, to flee the jurisdiction really with -- unlike most cases, with very little downside. The worse that happens if he flees and gets caught is he's brought back to the United States and does a jail sentence that probably will be the rest of his life. If he stays, he's facing pretty much the prospect of the same result, a sentence that may, in fact, result in him being in jail for the rest of his life, given his age.

And, your Honor, we respectfully submit that given the shifting of the burden in these really remarkable circumstances of a defendant who's not a U.S. citizen, who's facing the equivalent of a life sentence, and who's now basically would be free on an unsecured bond, that the circumstances dictate the defendant should start serving his sentence, in effect,

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immediately. And the defendant should be remanded on the grounds that he cannot meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a risk of flight.

THE COURT: Mr. Naftalis.

MR. NAFTALIS: Most respectfully, I find this application most surprising and a baseless one. And I say it with -- most advisedly.

You have a situation here where our client, for almost two and-a-half years, has met every single condition of the bond that was set here. Your Honor got a report today from the office of pretrial services, which we were given a copy of when we entered the room, in which the office of pretrial services has pointed out that he has complied with the terms of his bail all the way through.

And I can sort of punctuate that a little bit because, in fact, if you check with Officer Forelli, who he deals with in pretrial services, you could hear anecdotal information such as Mr. Bennett was the one who has set up the monitoring system in the house in New Jersey because, whatever, I guess they're technophobes, like I, the marshals service, he actually set up the monitoring service which passed their muster in the electronic stuff. Once, when his bracelet broke down, he immediately reported it to Officer Forelli that it was malfunctioning and he went in. He's been meticulous in reporting to these people.

And secondly, something that the government consciously avoided bringing to your attention, his bond is signed by the three immediate members of his family. The three of them who are American citizens: His wife, his daughter, and his son. They have signed a \$50,000,000 bond on his behalf, and these are people with roots in the community. The daughter is a lawyer, works at a law firm; the son is an investment banker with a leading firm. The notion that he would run away and do that to his family, I mean, is incomprehensible. And all we have is rhetoric from the government there.

You also have the strict monitoring conditions in which he's under and which he's faithfully complied with for the last two and-a-half years. Of course, he has no passport; his wife has given up his passport; he has no effective way of leaving the country.

And with respect to other situations, in other situations in high-profile cases where people were facing enormous sentences, no such applications were ever granted. For example, the *Computer Associates* case, where the CEO of Computer Associates, Mr. Kumar, who, under the guidelines which were then in effect, more applicable now, after the *Gall* case, the guidelines are just, you know, one ingredient in the soup for your Honor to consider under 3533. He faced life imprisonment under his guidelines. After pleading guilty, he continued to be free on bond, even though there were admissions

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of obstruction of justice in that case.

After Kumar was sentenced or he got a 12-year sentence, he continued to be allowed to be -- remained free on bond to work out various issues of restitution and the like.

In the case in front of Judge Sand, the Adelphia case, which is one of the cases, the Rigases, who got 15 and 20-year sentences, one of them was an eighty -- somewhere in his eighties, they were allowed to remain free on bond pending appeal, even though they had the same sort of issues. Even Mr. Ebbers, who received the largest sentence in history I've ever heard of, a real outlier sentence, 25 years, he was allowed to remain free on bond pending appeal and the like.

And apart from the fact that there is not the slightest bit of evidence for this most unfair application, it's also prejudicial. As your Honor knows, we have to put in sentencing submissions. And under 3533, your Honor has a lot of things which you can properly consider in determining in your best judgment what's a fair and just sentence under the case here. And obviously it's very prejudicial to us in being able to work with our client, who for the last two and-a-half years has been coming to our office every day on a daily basis to work on the case with us. So I don't see any good-faith basis for any change in bond here whatsoever.

THE COURT: Mr. Barofsky.

MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, if there's any specific

points you'd like me to respond to. The ones that jump out to me is, I mean the notion that a defendant can't chronically prepare for sentencing when he's incarcerated, obviously your Honor knows countless defendants who are able to prepare for sentencing when they are incarcerated; and having spent so much time with Mr. Naftalis, I think they are pretty much -- I'm sure they have contemplated this before, this is not the first time.

As opposed to those other cases, defendants who are released pending appeal after they've been convicted at trial is a different situation. There's obviously provisions within 3143 when there are issues on appeal that the judge finds are significant issues that need to be considered and possibly could result in the reversal of a conviction. That's a different -- those are different facts, and that's a different standard. Here, we have a guilty plea. I don't think that Mr. Bennett is going to be challenging his conviction in this case. He just gave a very detailed guilty plea.

With respect to his assurances to his family, I don't mean to minimize the bond between Mr. Bennett and his family, but on the flip side, we're looking at a man who just admitted to telling a series of lies to a large number of victims that resulted in the defrauding of \$2.4 billion. 1.7 or 8 billion, which we will show for restitution at the time of sentencing, has not been collected. People are out all of this money.

So this man maybe may have some allegiance to his family, but I think you have to look at the flip side as to how strong that may be by a man if he is willing to tell whatever lie is necessary to -- you know, on proportions that are mind-boggling, in the billions of dollars.

So we would respectfully submit that -- and we don't contest the fact, by the way, to be clear, that Mr. Bennett has complied with the conditions. And that is certainly a relevant factor that Mr. Naftalis points out and we don't contest it. We just don't think that that's enough to meet his burden, given his changed circumstances. And that to allow a defendant like this, who's also not a U.S. citizen, unlike those individuals, out on what is essentially an unsecured bond, it simply isn't the right course of action here.

MR. NAFTALIS: Just one small point, which they reminded me to mention. Although Mr. Bennett never changed his citizenship, like his wife, or became an American citizen like his children, he's lived in the United States for more than 30 years; so it's not like he has any roots anyplace else. So it's a little unfair for this eleventh-hour application which we heard about today to suggest as if he had someplace to go to.

And the government ignored the situation in the *Kumar* case. He said that all these other cases where people were on appeal. In the *Kumar* case it was a plea of guilty with someone

82FVBENP Plea facing, if one took the government's view of the thing, a life sentence. And he was allowed out, and he showed up. Even after he got his sentence of 12 years he remained out on bond to work out the restitution things. And we don't necessarily agree at all with the amount of the forfeiture issues here. I mean there's a forfeiture issue in the case, but the numbers he tosses around are not numbers that we have stipulated to or agreed to by any stretch of the imagination, and he throws them around. That's the only point I wanted to make. THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to remand Mr. Bennett, although I do think I can modify his bail conditions to create greater security. And I'm not going to do so for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that this indictment was filed in 2005.

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If Mr. Bennett had wanted to flee, he should have fled before he paid his lawyers all the money, and kept it, and gone to an appealing location. In fact, having pled guilty, to leave now, extraditing him will be much easier. So there's a balance there.

In addition, I note that just by statute, to release someone on appeal requires the same finding as the finding now. The judicial officer has to be persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee. That's half of the standard. The appellate issue is the other

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half, so it's the same standard.

And I also think that -- and I want to make it clear -- that I don't make any prejudgments about the substance of the case, but this is a case in which there has been a lot of information, publicly, at least, from the bankruptcy proceeding, and so this is a situation in which Mr. Bennett has had the opportunity to see an examiner put the evidence together. This is not a situation where as the case approaches trial, the government finally turns over information. I think Mr. Bennett has had a pretty good idea of the nature of the case and the evidence for at least some time, which makes the fact that he stays more significant.

and more effective to monitor Mr. Bennett if he stayed in one home or the other. And, I guess -- and tells me that basically the minute he leaves home they know about it. So given that it would take some time to -- since make an escape without a passport, I think that if we modified the bail conditions to limit his location, pretrial tells me that that makes it a more secure situation. In addition, if the government has any particular practical economic conditions that you can think of, I'm always willing to listen to those.

MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, the posting of additional assets by the defendant, they are largely forfeitable assets, but to the extent that there are assets that have not been --

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as I said, we estimate that it's in the range of approximately \$20,000,000. If we could at least secure those assets, these are assets that we've not yet secured by having him posted for the bond.

In addition, because, frankly, we're going to get those assets anyhow at the conclusion of this case, perhaps the posting the requiring of assets from the children. He mentioned that the children are successful, one's an investment banker. And if they have property, that may increase the incentive for Mr. Bennett to stay.

THE COURT: I think it's enough that he's -- the bond mortgages their future if he flees. We're not taking his kids' money.

MR. BAROFSKY: We aren't. I wouldn't suggest that we would take it other than if he fled. We would only be posting whatever interest. Because really right now the problem, your Honor, and I hear what your Honor is saying, is that he has an unsecured bond, and that just causes us a great deal of concern. I don't know what the circumstances are in *Kumar* or *Ebbers*, but this is a situation if there is a third party posting collateral --

THE COURT: For all those people, the bottom line is that for any defendant who was older and who was facing sentencing, in, lets call it, the post-Enron era, the situation was the same as for Mr. Bennett. The possibility that their

sentence would be -- that their residence in the Bureau of Prisons was the last residence they are going to have.

So I don't think this is really dramatically different. And I don't think the fact that he's a British citizen changes the situation, that he has to -- I think he gets the credit for having complied with all of his bail conditions and having had two and-a-half years to reflect.

MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, to be clear, I wasn't rearguing the bail application. I was merely trying to respond to your Honor's question whether there were additional economic circumstances.

THE COURT: I'm not asking his children, okay?

MR. BAROFSKY: Well, your Honor, then I would ask that in the alternative, if the defendant could post additional property or money that has not been seized or frozen by the government to secure this bond to at least increase so that there's some notional security of the bond. And I would ask for a number of \$10,000,000 in cash or property.

MR. NAFTALIS: Your Honor, I just think there is no basis whatsoever for the application. His children, the most important things in the world, are on the hook for \$50,000,000 if he were to leave. As they've indicated, they don't have any evidence of anything that he's ever done anything which would indicate he would leave. As your Honor said, quite correctly, we've known about the evidence in this case; your Honor

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remembers the litigation with respect to the bankruptcy trusts, these report the motion practice there. There's no secret about that. He's showed up all the time; he's complied with all the conditions. And there's not a reason in the world and there's not a basis in the world for any change here whatsoever.

MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, respectfully, I don't see any harm in having him post additional property that could only be used at this time for the purposes to facilitate flight. can't transfer these properties without violating the money laundering laws at this point, and I don't see -- I don't even understand how upping the collateral so as to prevent him from fleeing prejudices him in any way. And we're not asking even for all of the money that we believe is out there, we're asking for \$10,000,000 to provide some additional security on what is now an essentially an uncollateralized bond. It doesn't really move the ball tremendously for us, but it helps. And at least it would limit his ability to flee, should he make that decision, that it makes more sense to self-deport, since he's going to be going back to England anyhow before he has to face the sentence. I don't think the government's request is shocking or surprising or terribly dramatic, but we do think it would help, given the situation.

MR. NAFTALIS: They have not shown anything for this eleventh-hour request. It's totally and absolutely baseless.

And I don't think -- I don't know what property may or may not exist, but I don't think that there's any justification. And they just can't come into court without any basis whatsoever and allege things where all the evidence shows that this application is frivolous.

MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, I've listened to this for a fair amount of time now. And to characterize our application as frivolous and baseless and eleventh-hour I think is unfair.

THE COURT: At least the eleventh hour.

MR. BAROFSKY: I don't know when we were supposed to have made this application. I don't know if Mr. Naftalis would have had us make it when he notified us about the intent to change his plea yesterday afternoon, I don't think so. I think the only time we can make a plea based on the changed circumstance of the defendant entering a guilty plea is after he enters the guilty plea.

As far as it being baseless, the notion that a defendant who's facing 315 years of prison time --

THE COURT: He wishes.

MR. BAROFSKY: -- is -- that it's baseless to seek his remand when he is an English citizen subject to deportation --

THE COURT: Excuse me. We're not -- we're sending him to one of the most civilized countries in the world. It's not punishment to live in England, all right?

MR. BAROFSKY: Exactly, your Honor, which is why we

would ask for additional collateral.

THE COURT: And there is an extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain, so...

MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, I just don't understand the harm --

THE COURT: Because I'm not sure that the purpose of bail is to help you collect, you know, whatever you claim is your eventual restitution.

MR. BAROFSKY: Your Honor, if I wasn't clear on this argument, I apologize. The reason why we're asking for this is to assure the defendant's appearance. If that money is posted as a bond, it's not so that we can eventually seize it. If it's posted as a bond, it's not available for him to use to facilitate flight. It's also to secure the bond. This original bond was issued because it was secured by money and property. Right now it's essentially not secured by money and property.

THE COURT: But that argument applies to any additional money that he would put up. You would say it was just as forfeitable to you. So it then becomes unsecured, the same way.

MR. BAROFSKY: But it's unrestrained property, Judge, that's the difference. This property is actually restrained on top of the fact that it's -- because it's their direct proceeds.

What I'm suggesting, these are other properties that have not been restrained, because we're not able to restrain certain properties that are not proceeds. So this is money that is available to the defendant for use if he wants to facilitate flight.

The purpose of a bond, obviously security of a bond, and why your Honor endorsed the order of a secured bond, was because more security means less likelihood of flight. And all we're suggesting is taking this property that is now available to the defendant and posting it as security for the bond. And obviously if we are unable to prove, as Mr. Naftalis suggests, that this is property that's subject to asset forfeiture or restitution, he'll get it back when -- at the time of his sentencing or the time that he reports.

So we're not taking anything; we're not putting our hands on stuff that we're not entitled to; we're just asking that this bond be really secured, because right now we're basically -- it's the exact same situation we had in October of 2005, when he's going out on the same conditions, it's essentially an unsecured bond. And I don't think that your Honor would have ordered an unsecured bond back then, and we're just asking for some additional security: Money that is available for the defendant or property, and that we have that to secure the bond in case the defendant flees, and to encourage him not to flee.

MR. NAFTALIS: Apart from the fact that the government has proffered not a single fact that anything has changed, I don't agree with the notion that this bond is unsecured. One of the homes which is securing the bond -- there's \$5,000,000 cash, there's two residences, is in a trust. So without going through all the legalities, I don't think it's so quickly forfeitable, as they say.

And the notion of ignoring -- and that will be worked out; we're not here to litigate that issue, but I just -- and the notion that they can continue to ignore the fact that his wife and children have signed a \$50,000,000 bond that they will be on the hook for and their lives will be ruined, the notion there's not the slightest reason to suppose that he would do this to his children, he never has, and I have nothing else to say.

THE COURT: I think \$50,000,000 is a lot of money.

And it does directly affect wife, children, inheritances. So what about the issue of where he's going to live?

MR. NAFTALIS: If your Honor wants -- feels it would be better, pretrial services --

THE COURT: That's what pretrial tells me.

MR. NAFTALIS: I think he would -- there's a residence in New York and a residence in New Jersey. I think he would prefer to be in New Jersey where his wife is, and then subject to the fact he could just come to our offices and work with us,

which I think he's allowed to do, I think that would be his preference in terms of the quality of the life until the sentence, if that's --

THE COURT: I get the high sign from pretrial; so he'll stay in New Jersey.

MR. NAFTALIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Other than when he goes to you and also when you have to get him to pretrial for -- to probation for his interview.

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Which we do need to do within the two weeks so that the sentencing schedule can proceed. And the same is true for the government's description of the crimes.

Okay? I think we're done then.

MR. NAFTALIS: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. BAROFSKY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. GARCIA: Thank you, your Honor.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor.

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